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Abstract
Limited stockpiles of vaccine and antiviral drugs and other resources pose a formidable health-
care delivery challenge for an impending human-to-human transmittable inﬂuenza pandemic. The
existing preparedness plans by the Center for Disease Control and Health and Human Services
strongly underscore the need for eﬃcient mitigation strategies. Such a strategy entails decisions
for early response, vaccination, prophylaxis, hospitalization, and quarantine enforcement. This
paper presents a large scale simulation model that mimics stochastic propagation of inﬂuenza pan-
demic controlled by mitigation strategies. Impact of a pandemic is assessed via measures including
total numbers of infected, dead, denied hospital admission, and denied vaccine/antiviral drugs,
and also through an aggregate cost measure incorporating healthcare cost and lost wages. The
model considers numerous demographic and community features, daily human activities, vacci-
nation, prophylaxis, hospitalization, social distancing, and hourly accounting of infection spread.
The simulation model can serve as the foundation for developing dynamic mitigation strategies.
The simulation model is tested on a hypothetical community with over 1.1 million people. A
designed experiment is conducted to examine the statistical signiﬁcance of a number of model
parameters. The experimental outcomes can be used in developing guidelines for strategic use of
limited resources by healthcare decision makers. Finally, a Markov decision process (MDP) model
and its simulation based reinforcement learning framework for developing mitigation strategies
are presented. The simulation based framework is quite comprehensive and general, and can be
particularized to other types of infectious disease outbreaks.1 Introduction
In the event of an avian inﬂuenza pandemic outbreak, about 90 million people in the U.S. are ex-
pected to be ill and in need of assistance. Most existing contingency plans by the Center for Disease
Control and Health and Human Services strongly emphasize the need for eﬃcient and implementable
strategies for mitigating pandemic outbreaks (U.S. CDC, 2006; U.S. HHS, 2006). A mitigation strat-
egy incorporates vaccination, prophylaxis, hospitalization, and social distancing decisions. Obtaining
such a strategy scalable for large communities is a task of staggering complexity requiring a high
level of modeling and computing support. Such a need was recently recognized at the joint meeting
of the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM). The report
resulting from the meeting clearly stated the need to “develop both a framework and an action plan
for a systems approach to health care delivery based on a partnership between engineers and health
care professionals” (NAE, 2005).
The ﬁrst major inﬂuenza pandemic in recorded history attributed to virus serotype H1N1 took place
in 1918-1919. It is estimated that between 40 and 100 million deaths occurred worldwide. As much
as 50% of the U.S. population was infected. In 1957, a H2N2 virus (named Asian Flu) originated in
China, quickly spread throughout the world and caused 70,000 deaths in the U.S. In 1968, an H3N2
virus emerged in Hong Kong for which the fatalities in the U.S. were 34,000 (NIMGS, 2004a).
In recent years, a type of bird ﬂu called avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1) has emerged. This virus type oc-
curs naturally among wild birds worldwide and can easily spread to domesticated birds (U.S. CDC,
2006; NIMGS, 2004a). Since 1977, several cases of transmission of this virus from domesticated
birds to humans have been reported. However, the main fear presently in the scientiﬁc community
is that the constantly mutating variants of inﬂuenza A virus might adapt over time to infect and
spread from humans to humans. Currently, there are 25 known variants of H5N1 viruses and many
diﬀerent combinations of them are possible. The uncertainty about the exact variant of the emerging
virus presents an impediment to design a potent vaccine, lack of which in suﬃcient quantity poses a
signiﬁcant challenge to the responsible healthcare authorities.
In the event of a pandemic outbreak, even after the virus subtype is identiﬁed, production of a
potent vaccine in suﬃcient quantity could take up to six months (Fedson & Hant, 2003; Aunins,
Lee, & Volkin, 2000), too long for the vaccine to be an eﬀective resource in the critical early stage of
an outbreak. Even if the emerging virus belongs to a known subtype, the current stockpile of vac-
cines would be insuﬃcient. Hospital beds, healthcare personnel, antiviral drugs, social distancing,
and transportation logistic can also be constrained. This makes development of suitable pandemic
mitigation strategies a very challenging task, which must consider numerous epidemiological, socio-
logical, logistical, and operational factors. Since the devastation from a pandemic could occur very
rapidly (perhaps, in a few weeks), it is essential that scalable mitigation strategies supported by
comprehensive and scientiﬁcally valid models are developed beforehand and made available to the
healthcare delivery decision makers. Such pre-developed strategies could also serve as valuable tools
for healthcare personnel training and preparedness exercises.
Existing literature on pandemic preparedness uniformly echoes the need for strategic planning (Fed-
1son & Hant, 2003; U.S. HHS, 2007; WHO, 2004; Institute of Medicine, 2004). Most of the papers
and reports on pandemic preparedness are focused on qualitative discussions and mock exercises
(human simulations). Few studies are available that use either analytical or computer simulation
models (Patel, Longini, & Halloran, 2005; Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2005;
NIMGS, 2004b; Longini, Halloran, Nizam, & Yang, 2004; Longini & Hill, 2003). The recent work
by (Patel et al., 2005) presents an excellent simulation based framework under which vaccination
distribution strategies can be studied. The concept of epidemic prevention potential (EPP) was
introduced in (Halloran, Longini, Cowart, & Nizam, 2002) to measure the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent
intervention strategies. They developed a simulation model on which they test EPP of vaccination
strategies for seasonal epidemics. Extent of vaccination needed to contain pandemic outbreak is
studied in (Longini & Hill, 2003; Halloran, Longini, Nizam, & Yang, 2002; Kaplan, Craft, & Wein,
2002). Diﬀerent purposes that are served by vaccines and antiviral drugs in pandemic preparedness
are discussed in (Monto, 2005). The study by (Fraser, Riley, Anderson, & Ferguson, 2004) identi-
ﬁes the impact of epidemiological properties of virus on outbreak control strategies such as tracing,
isolation, and quarantining of symptomatic individuals. (Gani & Leach, 2004) developed a model to
study the impact of delays in implementing outbreak control measures. An excellent treatment of
the economic impact of pandemic inﬂuenza outbreak in the U.S. can be found in (Meltzer, Cox, &
Fukuda, 1999).
Our literature exploration has revealed that research eﬀorts have concentrated on 1) large scale hu-
man simulations at the local level, 2) qualitative discussions, and 3) mathematical and computer
simulation models that examine individual intervention mechanisms while considering only a small
subset of the pandemic parameters. The principle shortcomings of the current literature are as
follows. Lessons learned from human simulations do not extrapolate to communities with diﬀerent
demographics and to pandemics with diﬀerent epidemiological properties. It seems almost impossible
to construct a purely mathematical paradigm to capture all essential characteristics of a pandemic
and its available mitigation actions. This has manifested in the limited scope of the few existing math-
ematical models. Simulation models and recently developed simulation based stochastic optimization
techniques oﬀer signiﬁcant promise to alleviate the above shortcomings. But no such attempt has
yet been undertaken to address the challenge of pandemic mitigation. Simulation based approaches
have been reported that account for only a limited number of parameters characterizing a pandemic
and associated mitigation actions. The simulation model presented here seeks to overcome some
of the above fundamental barriers impeding the development and deployment of computationally
tractable decision support models that can consolidate all the major intervention tools (vaccination,
prophylaxis, social distancing, and hospitalization) under an overall economic impact measure.
This paper presents a simulation model that mimics stochastic propagation of pandemic inﬂuenza
outbreaks impacted by the decisions made by the healthcare oﬃcials in communities with millions
of people. The model considers the following.
• Community features:
– Large communities with several population centers and millions of households
– Varying sizes of households based on census data
2– Variety of establishments including businesses, factories, schools, churches, public facili-
ties, shopping centers, and dining and entertainment centers
– Contact rate for each type of business (number of people contacted by an infected individ-
ual per hour, based on the nature of interactions within the establishment, e.g., working,
shopping, dining, etc.)
• Demographic features:
– Population distribution based on age, gender, parenthood, and occupation
– Daily human activities for both weekdays and weekends subject to social distancing poli-
cies in eﬀect
• Physiological features:
– Health condition of each individual
– Infection susceptibility
– Immunity status
– Vaccination and prophylaxis status
• Behavioral features:
– Impact on daily schedule
– Propensity and promptness to seek medical assistance in the presence of inﬂuenza symp-
toms
– Conformance to voluntary quarantine
– Probability of violation of mandatory quarantine
• Epidemiological features:
– Virulence of the virus
– Infection probability based on age, gender, health condition, vaccination status, and na-
ture of virus
– Rate of infection spread
– Rate of mortality
– Average lengths of incubation period and disease period
– Eﬀectiveness of vaccine and antiviral drugs
• Mitigation strategy related features:
– Outbreak detection delay of the early warning systems
– Delay in deployment of ﬁeld responders
– Consideration of limited stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs
– Risk group determination (based on virus virulence, age, and health condition) for vacci-
nation, prophylaxis, and hospitalization
3– Target length of vaccination and prophylaxis periods, i.e., length of time (say, 48 hours)
within which the risk groups are to be administered vaccine/antiviral drug based on the
availability of healthcare personnel and facilities.
– Thresholds for declaration of voluntary quarantine, closing of schools and public facilities,
and distribution of protective supplies
– Mandatory (at home) quarantine period
– Degree of monitoring of mandatory quarantine (based on availability of enforcement per-
sonnel)
– Average length of hospital stay (depending on virus virulence, available bed capacity).
As evident from above, our simulation program takes a comprehensive account of the stochastic
propagation of pandemic and also the impact of possible decision choices of responsible healthcare
agencies. The simulation eﬀectively tracks the hourly changes in the community status through the
following: 1) activity, location, and disease stage of each individual, 2) status of mitigation related
actions and resource availabilities, 3) the numbers of new and cumulative infections and deaths,
4) number of hospital admission denials, and 5) number of denials of vaccine/antiviral drugs. The
simulation also accounts for the economic impact of the pandemic in terms of loss of wages and
healthcare cost to the aﬀected population.
Our simulation program can accommodate features speciﬁc to pandemic outbreaks of other infec-
tious diseases such as smallpox, pneumonic plague, etc. The program is also suitable for modeling
epidemics like annual inﬂuenza outbreaks. A 2-level fractional factorial experiment is conducted to
examine sensitivities of seven factors (hospital bed capacity, delay in deployment of ﬁeld respon-
ders, average length of hospitalization, percentage of mandatory quarantine violation, percentage
of voluntary quarantine conformance, threshold for declaration of voluntary quarantine, and target
length of vaccination period) toward three of the critical output measures: total number of infected,
total number of deaths, and the total cost. Statistically signiﬁcant factors can be used in developing
guidelines for the decision makers.
The program integrates all possible decision elements and assesses their performance via detailed mea-
sures such as total numbers of infected, dead, denied hospital admission, and denied vaccine/antiviral
drugs, and also an aggregate measure via total cost of healthcare and lost wages. Thus, it oﬀers an
excellent foundation for simulation based stochastic optimization of dynamic mitigation strategies.
A framework for such a decision optimization based on a Markov decision process model and its
reinforcement learning based solution strategy are developed and presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail various possible elements
of pandemic mitigation strategies. Section 3 presents an outline of our simulation model. A de-
tailed numerical study of a sample community of over 1.1 million inhabitants is conducted in Section
4. Also presented in Section 4 is a sensitivity analysis using a designed statistical experiment. A
simulation based mitigation strategy optimization framework is presented in Section 5. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
42 Pandemic Mitigation Strategies
Dealing eﬀectively with a pandemic inﬂuenza outbreak, which, as history shows, is likely to progress
rapidly, will require careful planning and strategizing considering factors such as assessment of re-
source needs and their prioritization, resource deployment, transportation, logistics of information
sharing, monitoring and enforcement, and maintenance of law and order. Without a properly planned
strategy, the chaos that might ensue might be disastrous causing large scale fatalities and substantial
economic damage. The decision vector constituting a strategy may include the following:
1. delay in early detection of an outbreak;
2. delay in deployment of ﬁeld responders;
3. vaccination plan;
(a) risk group (deﬁned by age and health condition),
(b) target length of vaccination period,
4. prophylaxis plan;
(a) risk group (deﬁned by age and health condition),
(b) target length of prophylaxis period,
5. hospitalization plan;
(a) risk group (deﬁned by age and health condition),
(b) average hospitalization period,
6. social distancing plan;
(a) declaration of voluntary quarantine,
(b) average length of mandatory quarantine for sick who are denied hospital admission,
(c) extent of monitoring for mandatory quarantine.
The ﬁrst two elements of the decision vector concerning delays in early detection and deployment of
ﬁeld responders are static (one time) decisions, which are made based on availability and eﬀectiveness
of early warning systems and the cost of deployment readiness. The rest of the decision elements
are dynamic since they are evaluated periodically and their values are chosen based on the state of
the pandemic. For example, in the early stage of the pandemic, a decision maker might deﬁne a
risk group for vaccination primarily based on available stockpile and knowledge from past pandemic
outbreaks. But, as the pandemic progresses and the demographics of infected become available, the
decision maker might redeﬁne the risk group accordingly. The state of the pandemic can be deﬁned
as a vector with the following elements: total number of infected, total number of deaths, rate of
infection, mortality rate, remaining stockpiles of vaccine and antiviral drugs, available vaccine and
antiviral drug administration capacity, and the available hospital bed capacity.
53 A Large Scale Simulation Model
The simulation model is designed to mimic the daily activities of the people of a large community
aﬀected by an outbreak. The model incorporates a set of decisions, which can be enforced by the
healthcare delivery authorities, and the impacts of these decisions on the health related attributes
and daily activities of the people. The model is developed using C++ programming language and
can be implemented on a desktop computer. The model was tested for communities having up to
over a million people on a Pentium 4 PC with 1GB memory. For a population of size approximately
100,000, the program took about 30 seconds for each day of simulation. For a community of 400,000
households with over 1.1 million people, the program took about 50 minutes for each simulation day.
Such a simulation model can exploit national high–performance computing cyberinfrastructure (e.g.,
TeraGrid) to perform very-large-scale computations necessary to develop and test strategic and tac-
tical mitigation decisions for large metropolitan communities. It may be noted that such simulation
models can also be used oﬄine for synthesizing various apriori decision alternatives (through “what-
if” analysis), in which case the run times could be of secondary importance. Before discussing some
of the major elements of the simulation model, we present a pseudo version of the main program via
Figure 1 to provide an idea of the program structure.
3.1 Infection Spread Mechanism
Figure 2 shows an outline of the mechanism used in the simulation model for detailed hourly ac-
counting of the infection spread. The simulation runs in a loop for a prespeciﬁed number of days,
hour by hour for each day. At the beginning of each day, every member of the community is assigned
his/her daily schedule (on an hourly basis). The schedule is dictated by the day of the week and a
variety of personal and pandemic related factors. At the end of each hour, the model scans every
community establishment (oﬃces, factories, schools and public facilities, businesses, stores, etc.).
The scan identiﬁes, for each establishment including workplaces, the set of people that are present
during that hour including those who are contagious. Each contagious individual generates new
contacts (chosen randomly from the non-infected), the number of which is prespeciﬁed depending
on the type of the establishment, its assumed typical human interaction pattern, and the number
of contagious individuals present. Each contact either becomes infected or is able to ﬁght the virus
oﬀ, which depends on his/her age, health condition, vaccination status, virulence of the virus, and
the state of the pandemic. A disease clock for each infected individual is maintained and hourly
advanced to identify various phases of his/her disease.
3.2 Post Contact Scenarios
Figure 3 depicts various scenarios that an infected individual is likely to go through. Given the large
percentage of uninsured population and the diﬃculties often faced in seeking medical assistance,
particularly in the United States, a probability exists that an infected individual will not see a doctor.
It is also considered that, before a pandemic declaration is made, people with symptoms might wait
for a random amount of time before seeking medical aid. Those who actually seek medical aid are
admitted to the hospital depending on their medical condition, hospital admission policy, and bed
availability. Those not admitted are put under a mandatory home quarantine. Prespeciﬁed lengths
6Figure 1: Pseudo version of the main program.
of time are allocated for hospital stay and home quarantine. Family members of infected/quaranteed
individuals are not considered to be at higher risk of infection; however, this can be incorporated into
existing simulation as a future consideration. It is assumed that a percentage of home quarantined
7Figure 2: Tracking of infection spread.
will violate the restrictions in the early stage of disease and will add to the spread. Since the stockpile
of antiviral drugs could be limited, it is also expected that all quarantined at home might not receive
antiviral drugs. The model also considers a certain mortality rate depending on age, health condition,
prophylaxis status, and the eﬀectiveness of antiviral drugs. Recovered individuals are assumed to
develop full immunity to subsequent infection.
3.3 Mitigation Decision Mechanism
As shown in Figure 4, the decision process suﬀers from two unavoidable initial delays, namely early
detection delay and the deployment delay of ﬁeld responders. The early detection delay results from
the need for a minimum sample size for the statistical methods to produce a warning signal without
excessive Type I or Type II errors, for which acceptable levels are decided by the decision makers.
Deployment delay is a function of resource availability, and hence the decision makers have the power
to control the length of this delay. The above decisions are made only once. The remaining elements
of the decision vector, vaccination plan, prophylaxis plan, social distancing plan, and hospitalization
plan, are system state dependent. These are reviewed in light of the system state and are modiﬁed
as often as necessary. The plans and their constituents are depicted in the ﬁgure. The impacts of
the decision are measured in terms of the numbers of infected and dead, and also via total cost of
medical care and lost wages.
8Figure 3: Post contact scenarios for an infected individual.
Figure 4: Decision process of pandemic mitigation.
93.3.1 Vaccination and Prophylaxis
The simulation model considers ﬁxed stockpiles of vaccine and antiviral drugs. Declaration of a
pandemic is triggered by a predetermined number of conﬁrmed cases. Upon declaration, the health-
care authorities choose plans for vaccination and prophylaxis. Both of these plans consist of two
decisions: risk group and rate of administration. The risk group, deﬁned by age, identiﬁes those
eligible to receive vaccine/antiviral drugs. The rate of administration is a function of the number of
people in the risk group and the target period of administration. Selection of risk group is primarily
guided by the stockpile, while the rate of administration depends on the availabilities of healthcare
personnel and facilities, and also transportation and other logistics. Field responders are assumed to
be pre-vaccinated and have full immunity. Hence, the available healthcare capacity is assumed to be
unaﬀected during the course of the pandemic. The model considers the eﬀectiveness of both vaccine
and antiviral drugs by reducing the probability of infection and mortality, respectively. Vaccination
status is tracked for each individual, which makes it possible to examine the impact of “herd immu-
nity” on an outbreak by assigning a large percentage of the population a “yes” for the vaccination
status.
3.3.2 Social Distancing and Hospitalization
Two types of social distancing are considered: voluntary quarantine and mandatory quarantine.
Voluntary quarantine declaration is based on a prespeciﬁed number of conﬁrmed cases and it allows
for closing of schools and other public facilities. It is considered that a percentage of the people
working in privately owned businesses would not go to work and reduce their outside activities.
It is also considered that upon declaration of voluntary quarantine, people will take precautionary
measures leading to reduction in infection probability. Mandatory quarantine can be either at home
or at hospital. Since the hospital beds will be insuﬃcient, the model considers a hospital admission
plan consisting of risk group and average length of hospital stay. Those deemed able to recover at
home (not part of the risk group) or are unable to be provided with a hospital bed, are asked to be
quarantined at home.
4 A Large Community as a Testbed
To demonstrate that the simulation model could serve as a reliable tool for an accurate assessment
of the devastation of an impending pandemic, and also how it could support the challenging task
of pandemic mitigation, the model was implemented on a sample problem involving a hypotheti-
cal community with over 1.1 million people. The demonstration is accomplished in the following
steps: building the sample community, model validation, pandemic impact assessment, and decision
support.
4.1 Sample Problem
All critical considerations for the simulation model are presented in Sections 3.1 through 3.3 and
Figures 2, 3, and 4. The following parameter values were used for the sample problem.
• four population centers,
10• 100,000 households in each center,
• nine diﬀerent household types consisting of diﬀerent combinations of up to ﬁve members (adults
and children),
• adults grouped into two age groups and the children grouped into ﬁve age groups,
• each adult has three health conditions and the children have two,
• 13 types of community establishments with a total of 52,
• each establishment type has probabilities of being a workplace, place for weekday after work
errand, place for weekend errand, and place for errand during voluntary quarantine, human
interaction pattern (number of contacts per contagious person),
• available stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs of 250,000 for each,
• six diﬀerent base rates of infection and mortality based on age and gender (gender is considered
in case a speciﬁc gender becomes more prone to the virus),
• ﬁve degrees of virulence of the virus,
• three phases of disease progress: incubation (not contagious), contagious, and recovery (not
contagious),
• early detection delay of 48 hours,
• deployment delay of ﬁve conﬁrmed cases,
• threshold for declaration of voluntary quarantine of 500 conﬁrmed cases,
• vaccine and prophylaxis risk groups: below 10 and above 70 years old. Since the model tracks
many attributes of each person including age and health condition, it is possible to adopt more
general deﬁnitions of risk groups (e.g., vaccination of individuals with immune compromised
systems, children less than 6 months, and allergic individuals) and administration scheme (e.g.,
two vaccine doses, prioritization within a risk group).
• target vaccination and prophylaxis period of 40 hours,
• average hospitalization period of 72 hours,
• vaccine and antiviral drug eﬀectiveness of 0.4 and 0.3, respectively (as the model tracks age of
all individuals, implementation of age dependent eﬀectiveness is also possible),
• voluntary quarantine conformance probability of 0.5,
• violation probability of mandatory home quarantine of 0.5, and
• mandatory home quarantine period 120 hours,
• medical cost and lost wage estimates per a CDC paper (Meltzer et al., 1999), which are inﬂation
adjusted to 2006 per (Halfhill, 2006).
11Since lack of suﬃcient vaccine availability is a major issue, mass vaccination prior to an outbreak to
develop herd immunity was not considered in the sample problem. Though the community presented
in the sample problem is not based on data from an actual community, its features are similar to
those of communities that are found in the United States.
4.2 Model Validation
Validation of our simulation model presents a diﬃcult challenge due to little or no availability of his-
torical pandemic data that can be extrapolated to the present societal context. Diﬃculty also stems
from the scant knowledge about the virus itself, even among the professionals. Hence, we adopted
the following steps to ensure suﬃcient model validity: 1) continuous feedback and cross validation
of the model by medical practitioners, epidemiologists, and biostatisticians, 2) gathering suggestions
and feedback during presentations at local epidemiologic forums, and 3) rigorous examination of
output data for sample problems with various parameter combinations. The above steps resulted in
very signiﬁcant alterations and improvements of the model during its developmental period. Cur-
rently, we are planning to implement our model for annual (interpandemic) inﬂuenza outbreaks in
the Tampa Bay region. This plan is proposed and supported by the local health oﬃcials responsible
for healthcare delivery in the event of an outbreak. We are currently in the process of gathering
data.
4.3 Pandemic Impact Assessment
To demonstrate the ability of our model to provide support for pandemic impact assessment, ten
diﬀerent exploratory scenarios of the testbed problem were simulated. The recorded statistics include
number of new infections, cumulative infections, cumulative number of visits to the doctor, remaining
stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral drugs, number of denied hospital admission, and cumulative
number of dead. We also collected the total cost over a period of time for each scenario. The
scenarios were created by varying some of the key input and decision parameters, as shown in Table
1.
Table 1: Results from the testbed problem scenarios.
12Case #1 represents the base case. Variations in the parameter values in cases #2 through #10 were
adopted arbitrarily, with the only purpose of demonstrating the potential of the model to support
healthcare decision making. If deemed appropriate, additional parameters can be incorporated (e.g.,
the variance of length of hospital stay in addition to the average length). The last three columns
of the table show three of the performance measures. The daily values of these measures were also
recorded to examine their trends. Two such trend plots for cases #1 and #10 are shown in Figures
5 and 6.
Figure 5: Trends for infection rate and cumulative values of infected and dead: Case #1.
The trend plots clearly show some of the pandemic impacts and their dynamics over time, which can
serve as valuable inputs for the decision makers. For example, the plots of the infection rates show
distinct diﬀerences in their values, slopes, and initial patterns. The infections in case #1 happen in
a shorter time span compared to case #10, with the maximum rate of case #1 being nearly 75%
higher. The plots for the cumulative number of infected are comparable, however, case #1 reaches
its maximum value about two days earlier. Since deaths can only result from those who are infected,
the curve showing cumulative deaths has a very similar shape to that of cumulative infections. The
average delay of the occurrence of death from the day of infection is clearly manifested by the lag
between the two curves. Due to the faster rise in infection in case #1, its cumulative deaths curve
reaches its maximum value sooner.
4.4 Decision Support
Though the trend plots discussed in the above section are informative, they lack in providing deﬁnitive
guidance to the decision makers in isolating the signiﬁcant factors, which is required to develop a
mitigation strategy. To address the above concern, we conducted a 2-level fractional factorial designed
statistical experiment. Seven input factors chosen for the experiment are: hospital bed capacity,
13Figure 6: Trends for infection rate and cumulative values of infected and dead: Case #10.
delay in deployment of ﬁeld responders, average length of hospitalization, percentage of mandatory
quarantine violation, percentage of voluntary quarantine conformance, threshold for declaration of
voluntary quarantine, and target length of vaccination period. The choice of these factors was done
as follows. The rather large number of input and decision factors were classiﬁed into two categories:
perceived to be signiﬁcant and potentially signiﬁcant. The potentially signiﬁcant factors were chosen
for the study. The studied factors and their two diﬀerent levels (low and high) are shown in Table
2. The analysis was conducted with respect to three diﬀerent output measures: cumulative number
of infections, cumulative number of deaths, and the total cost of healthcare and lost wages. The
choice of 2-level fractional factorial experiment was primarily motivated by our desire to limit the
number of experiments. Based on the knowledge of the inﬂuence of the above factors on the output
measures, any interactions among the factors appeared highly unlikely. Hence, we chose to focus
our attention on the main factors only. The fractional factorial design used for the study is a L16
Taguchi array, which allowed for testing signiﬁcance of seven input factors leaving eight (8) columns
(eight degrees of freedom) for error assessment. In the interest of computational time, we used a
smaller sized community (compared to the testbed described earlier) with the following changes in
the parameter values: 10,000 households in each population center giving a total of approximately
111,000 people, 25,000 doses each of vaccines and antiviral drugs, hospital bed capacity of 500, and
voluntary quarantine threshold of 500 doctor visits. The sixteen experimental combinations and the
corresponding output measure values are shown in Table 3.
4.4.1 ANOVA: Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the analysis of variance conducted on the data representing cumulative number of
infections in Table 3 are presented in Table 4. As shown, for the chosen parameter values of the
sample problem, four of the seven factors are found to be statistically signiﬁcant. These factors
14Table 2: Factor values for 2-level experimental design.
are: delay in deployment of ﬁeld responders (B), percentage of mandatory quarantine violation
(D), target length of vaccination period (E), and percentage of voluntary quarantine conformance
(F). These were also the only signiﬁcant factors for the other two performance measures, namely
cumulative number of dead and total cost. Since all of the signiﬁcant factors are decision variables,
this information can be used to deﬁne an eﬀective decision space for the learning based mitigation
strategy optimization process discussed in the next section.
Table 3: L16 experiment array with output data.
5 Mitigation Strategy Optimization Framework
In the previous section, we demonstrated through a numerical study that the proposed model can
eﬀectively capture the dynamics of pandemic spread constrained by a variety of possible mitigation
plans that can be chosen by responsible authorities. As alluded to earlier, a mitigation strategy is a
collection of decision vectors (containing the four plans, each of which is a vector by itself) indexed
by time. The output of the model measures the “goodness” of a chosen strategy. But, since the
15Table 4: ANOVA results.
strategy space is extremely large, it is imperative to develop an approach that can sweep through
the space and identify a good strategy. In this section, we present a framework for simulation based
stochastic optimization, which can be exploited to select a strategy with an objective of minimizing
a chosen output measure.
In what follows, we refer to the community aﬀected by an outbreak as the system. Deﬁne system
state at any time t as Xt = (Ni,Nd,Ri,Rd,Sv,Sp,Cv,Cp,Ch), where
Ni= cumulative number of infected in the system,
Nd= cumulative number of dead in the system,
Ri= daily rate of infection (daily increment in the number of new infected cases),
Rd= daily rate of mortality (the daily increment in the number of new dead cases),
Sv= remaining stockpile of vaccine,
Sp= remaining stockpile of prophylactic (antiviral) drug,
Cv= available vaccine administration capacity,
Cp= available prophylactic drug administration capacity,
Ch= available hospital bed capacity.
Deﬁne a random process X = {Xt : t ∈ R+} as the pandemic spread process. We now deﬁne a
subset of the above process that is embedded at the decision epochs. Let Tn denote the time of the
nth decision epoch during the pandemic evolution. Let the system state at time Tn be denoted by
Xn. Deﬁne two random processes as
T = {Tn : n ∈ N} → decision time process,
X = {Xn : n ∈ N} → decision state process.
Deﬁne the decision vector at the nth decision epoch as, Dn = (V,P,Q,H), where
V denotes the vaccination plan vector (rv,lv),
P denotes the prophylaxis plan vector (rp,lp),
Q denotes the quarantine plan vector (qv,qm
m,qm
l ), and
16H denotes the hospital admission plan vector (rh,lh),
where
• rv,rp,rh represent the risk groups for vaccination, prophylaxis, and hospitalization, respec-
tively, which depend on age and health condition,
• lv, lp represent the target lengths of vaccination and prophylaxis periods, respectively,
• lh represents the average length of hospital stay,
• qv = (0,1) represents state of voluntary quarantine,
• qm
m,qm
l denote the level and the length of monitoring for in-home mandatory quarantine, re-
spectively.
A decision process is deﬁned as
D = {Dn : n ∈ N}.
If we consider that the decisions are reviewed at equal intervals of time during a pandemic evolution,
e.g., every day, so that Tn+1 − Tn = 1 day, then the decision state process X is a Markov chain.
The pandemic mitigation process can then be characterized as the joint process (X,D), which is a
Markov decision process (MDP).
5.1 Obtaining a Pandemic Mitigation Strategy
Optimal methods of solving a MDP are value and policy iterations (Puterman, 1994). If minimizing
the total cost is used as criterion for optimization, then the above algorithms are based on solving
Bellman’s optimality equation given as
V(j) = min
a∈Aj
(
r(j,a) + β
X
k∈E
p(j,a,k)V(k)
)
,
where
V(j) denotes the expected discounted value (cost) of the system starting at state j,
Aj denotes the set of available decisions at state j,
r(j,a) denotes the immediate reward (cost) of choosing decision a in state j,
β denotes the discounting factor,
E denotes the system state space, and
p(j,a,k) denotes the one-step transition probability under action a.
For problems with very large state and decision spaces with complex interactions among them, like
the pandemic mitigation problem, obtaining the transition probabilities is almost impossible. More-
over, the value iteration algorithm requires synchronous updating of values for all the states in every
iteration, which is diﬃcult. Policy iteration requires the solution of a system of linear equations, with
the number of equations equal to the cardinality of the state space, in each iteration of the algorithm.
17Therefore, we propose the use of simulation based stochastic optimization approach (reinforcement
learning (RL), in particular), which has recently been applied successfully to solve complex decision
making problems (Gosavi, 2004; Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996; Ravulapati, Rao, & Das, 2002;
Das, Gosavi, Mahadevan, & Marchalleck, 1999; Mahadevan, 1996). In this approach, the simulation
model obviates the need for transition probabilities, and the values are updated asynchronously (one
at a time) reducing the computational burden. For solving discounted reward MDPs, provably con-
vergent and optimal seeking RL algorithms exist in the literature. A sketch of an RL algorithm that
can be used to obtain a mitigation strategy is presented below.
A RL Algorithm
Initialize the reinforcement values R(j,a) (synonymous to the values V (j,a) in Bellman’s equation)
for all states j ∈ E, and all decision a ∈ A to zeros and step count n = 1. Select initial value for
the learning rate αn (usually small, e.g., 0.01) and exploration probability γn (say, 0.3), parameters
needed to decay αn and γn during the learning process, and a stopping criterion Maxcycles (maximum
number of pandemic cycles of say 90 days each to be simulated, which can be determined through
initial trials). The stopping criterion is chosen such that it allows suﬃcient time for the R-values to
converge.
Initialize cycle = 1, and start simulation.
1. If the current system state is j, perform the following steps.
2. Choose a decision (say, a) for which the R-value in state j (R(j,a)) is minimum (a greedy
strategy) with probability (1 − γn), or an arbitrary decision from the available decision set
minus the greedy action with probability γn. If the state has not been visited yet and all
R-values are zeros, select an arbitrary decision.
3. Simulate the chosen action, proceed to the next decision epoch and determine the new state
(say, k).
4. Update the reinforcement value of R(j,a) as follows:
Rnew(j,a) = (1 − αn)Rold(j,a) + β [r(j,a) + minb∈AkRold(k,b)],
where r(j,a) denotes the immediate cost of choosing decision a in state j, and β is the discount
factor.
5. n ← n + 1.
6. Decay αn and γn using a suitable method.
7. if n ≤ 90 (length of a pandemic cycle), repeat the numbered steps above with j ← k,
else, n ← 1, cycle ← cycle + 1.
If cycles ≤ Maxcycles, repeat the numbered steps above.
else, rerun the simulation for a number of cycles using the learned R-values and assess the
average discounted cost of pandemic.
186 Conclusions
The need for eﬀective mitigation strategies is well recognized and documented in federal and state
level pandemic preparedness publications. However, existing scientiﬁc methodologies are limited to
either human simulations or mathematical and computer simulation models with limited scope. This
paper presents a comprehensive large scale simulation model for supporting development of mitiga-
tion strategies. The simulation model incorporates a variety of decision factors related to plans for
vaccination, prophylaxis, social distancing, and hospital admission. The model oﬀers a variety of
performance measures including an aggregate cost measure. A hypothetical community of over 1.1
million people was used in demonstrating the utility of the simulation model. Scenarios were created
by varying some of the key input and decision parameters, for which three performance measures
(cumulative numbers of infected and dead, and total cost of medical care and lost wages) are pre-
sented. A statistical designed experiment was used to show how factors with signiﬁcant impact on a
performance measure can be identiﬁed. The problem of mitigating a pandemic outbreak is modeled
as a Markov decision process (MDP). A framework for solving the MDP using a simulation based
reinforcement learning algorithm is presented.
The simulation model, though quite comprehensive, oﬀers many other possible ways of enhancement,
e.g., consideration of proportion of transmission occurring prior to symptoms ((Fraser et al., 2004)),
change in the virility of the virus with pandemic progress, and availability of more potent vaccines
and antiviral drugs during the course of an outbreak. Validation of the simulation model with actual
outbreak data is essential for its widespread recognition and application. Such a validation task
is very challenging since it requires the coordination with a variety of healthcare agencies (govern-
ment and private) and access to archived data. The approach for learning based mitigation strategy
optimization, as presented here, is novel, but must overcome many diﬃculties before its successful
implementation. A primary diﬃculty stems from the need to isolate the impact (e.g., cost) of a
decision, since the impacts are not readily realized and might be compounded with other decisions.
Without a clear strategy to assess this impact (which is referred to as the immediate cost, r(j,a)),
learning of the reinforcement values will be incoherent. We are currently working on these issues and
plan to document our ﬁndings in future publications. An example of such an RL application in the
context of ﬁnding eﬃcient medical diagnosis strategies can be found in one of our recently published
works (Fakih & Das, 2006).
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